A Critique of the ICJ Ruling of 17 July 2019 on the Case of Commander Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, Indian Navy, cover name, Hussein Mubarak Patel, Businessman

By Syed Sharfuddin

In May 2017, India filed an application against Pakistan at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, maintaining that Pakistan had breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (the Convention) to provide a fair trial to its national, Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2016 on charges of espionage and was awarded death sentence by a Pakistani military court in April 2017. 1

The ICJ admitted India’s application under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to which both India and Pakistan are signatories. In admitting the Indian application, the ICJ dismissed the objections of Pakistan to India’s application citing abuse of process, abuse of rights and unlawful conduct by India.

The ICJ jurisdiction was limited to “providing reparation only for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act of Pakistan that fell within the Court’s jurisdiction, namely Pakistan’s breach of obligations under Article 36 of the Convention and not of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. 2

In admitting India’s application for a hearing, the ICJ disregarded a well established rule of customary international law that normally a complaint of a State against another State regarding its national is not considered until the accused has exhausted the legal remedies available under the law of that State. In this case, ICJ did not ask India to wait for the appellate remedy available to the Jadhav to be fully exhausted in Pakistan.

The 149 paragraph verdict, given by a panel of 16 distinguished judges, including the sole dissenting ad-hoc judge from Pakistan, Justice (Retd) Tasadduq Hussain Jillani, has been claimed by both State parties as vindication of their respective legal positions.

The ICJ accepted India’s assertion that Pakistan was in breach of Article 36 of the Convention and asked Pakistan for the continued stay of the sentence pending finalisation of the proceedings in the light of the ICJ ruling.

The ICJ did not accept India’s position that the reparation of the injury should annul the decision of the Pakistani military court and ask Pakistan to free Jadhav.

The ICJ accepted Pakistan’s submission that the appropriate remedy in this case was the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of the accused .3

The ICJ did not accept Pakistan’s position that Article 36 did not apply to persons arrested on charges of espionage 4.

Legal experts agree that the ICJ could go only as far as it has gone; that the Court had no mandate to annul the decision of the military court, within the scope of its jurisdiction, having acknowledged that Pakistan and its criminal justice system were fully compliant with due process. 5

Ruling
The full summary of the ICJ ruling announced on 17 July 2019 is contained in paragraph 149 of the decision. 6

The ICJ found that “Pakistan acted in breach of its obligations under Article 36 of the Convention: firstly, by not informing Mr. Kulbhushan Jadhav of his rights; secondly, by not informing India, without delay, of the arrest and detention of Mr. Jadhav; and thirdly, by denying access to Mr. Jadhav by the consular officers of India, contrary to their right, inter alia, to arrange for his legal representation”.

The ICJ acknowledged that Pakistan notified India on 25 March 2016 of the arrest and detention of Mr. Jadhav, as required by Article 36, paragraph 1B, of the Convention. 7

However, the fact that the notification was made some three weeks after the arrest, constituted a breach of the obligation to inform “without delay”, as required by Article 36, paragraph 1B of the Convention. 8

The ICJ held that Pakistan’s breach of paragraphs1A &1C of Article 36 of the Convention constituted “internationally wrongful acts of a continuing character”. 9. Pakistan was therefore “under an obligation to cease those acts and to comply fully with its obligations under Article 36 of the Convention. Consequently, Pakistan must inform Mr. Jadhav without further delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1B, and allow Indian consular officers to have access to him and to arrange for his legal representation, as provided by Article 36, paragraphs 1A and 1C.”

The ICJ ruled that “the appropriate remedy in this case for Pakistan” was to undertake an “effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav” by giving this process “full weight” to the “effect of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 paragraph 1 of the Convention, and guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused by the violation are fully examined”.

The ICJ took full cognizance of the fact that the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees, as a fundamental right, the right to a fair trial; that the right to a fair trial is “absolute” and “cannot be taken away”; and that all trials are conducted accordingly and, if not, “the process of judicial review is always available”.

The ICJ left the choice of ways to Pakistan for performing its obligation to provide effective review and reconsideration of the case but it noted that “freedom in the choice of means is not without qualification”, which is that the “obligation to provide effective review and reconsideration is an obligation of result, which must be performed unconditionally”. Therefore, “the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and its implications for the principles of a fair trial, should be fully examined and properly addressed; that Pakistan take all measures to provide for effective review and reconsideration, including, if necessary, by enacting appropriate legislation; and [observe] a continued stay of execution which is an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Jadhav” 10.

Observation 1
In May 2017 the ICJ admitted the application of India under Compulsory Settlement of Disputes without allowing the appellate process in Pakistan to be completed.

Yet two years later, in its ruling on 17 July 2019 the ICJ took cognizance of the fact that the “Constitution of Pakistan guarantees, as a fundamental right, the right to a fair trial; that the right to a fair trial is “absolute” and “cannot be taken away”; and that all trials are conducted accordingly and, if not, “the process of judicial review is always available” to persons under consideration 11.

Observation 2
In its July 2019 ruling, the ICJ said that Pakistan consistently maintained that Article 36 did not apply to Jadhav who was not just an Indian national but also a spy. The ICJ therefore inferred from this position that under Article 36:1A, Pakistan breached its obligation to inform Mr. Jadhav of his rights under that provision”. 12

On the other hand, under Article 36:1B, the ICJ did not infer that since the concerned Indian national was doing espionage on behalf of his government, his arrest and detention in Pakistan (which was not his normal place of residence on duty) should have come to the knowledge of India on the same day on 25 March 2016 when his phone went unanswered and messages stopped coming, thereby invalidating the obligation of the receiving State to inform the sending State of the arrest of its national without delay.

Observation 3
The ICJ further stated that it will interpret the 1963 Convention according to customary rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in Articles 31 & 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties in order to remove any ambiguity or obscurity in the 1963 Convention. India has not signed the 1969 Convention. Pakistan has signed the 1969 Convention but not ratified it.

It is interesting that while the Court declined to consider Pakistan’s plea for declining India’s request for admissibility of the case on the basis of customary law, the ICJ did not mind recourse to customary law in the interpretation of the 1963 Convention.

Observation 4
In considering the provisions of the bilateral agreement of 2008 between India and Pakistan, which covers “cases of arrest, detention or sentence made on political or security grounds” and commits each side to “examine the case on its merits” 13, the ICJ noted that it does not take away the right of the accused to have consular access under Article 36 of the Convention.

The ICJ accepted that under Article 73 paragraph 2 of the Convention, the 2008 Agreement is consistent with the Convention, as it confirms, supplements, extends or amplifies the provisions of the Convention and regulates matters not covered by the Convention. Yet, the ICJ did not direct the two State parties to resolve this matter in accordance with the bilateral Agreement of 2008 15.

It may be recalled that since 1972, India has consistently maintained that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved between India and Pakistan bilaterally in accordance with the provisions of the Simla Agreement between the two countries. The two State parties, the UN and the international community have supported the bilateral option, but never said that the Simla Agreement should be disregarded and the dispute should be resolved on the basis of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir calling on India to hold a plebiscite in the disputed territory.

Observation 5
The ICJ noted that if the signatory State parties to the 2008 Agreement “had intended to restrict in some way the rights guaranteed by Article 36, one would expect such an intention to be unequivocally reflected in the provisions of the Agreement.

The ICJ ruled that Article 36 of the Convention does not exclude from its scope persons suspected of espionage, despite the clear omission of espionage in the Convention, as opposed to a bilateral agreement between two sovereign countries which explicitly provides a framework for arrest, detention or sentence made on political or security grounds and calls for consideration of cases falling under this provision on merit.

Observation 6
In regard to the breach of Article 36 paragraphs A & C of the Convention, 14, the ICJ did not accept Pakistan’s submission that Pakistan had asked for vital information such as confirming the passport details and activities of the accused to verify his nationality and profession, which were not provided by India.

In rejecting the notion of any conditionality attached to right of the accused for consular access and the right of the State of the accused to arrange legal representation for him, as provided under Article 36:1A, the ICJ did not take into consideration the facts that the accused was an employee of an Indian spy agency and his alleged terrorist activities in Pakistan had made India complicit in the crime and created a direct conflict of interest, not foreseen in the Article at the time of the drafting of the Convention. The ruling also did not mention that Pakistan partially implemented Article 36 paragraph 1A by allowing the family of the accused to meet him in person.

As for the intent of the drafters of the Convention to include espionage in Article 36, it is correct that espionage was a well known state instrument when the Convention was negotiated, but it is also correct that state-sponsored terrorism and deploying spies as terrorists’ handlers in enemy states had not been invented.

Observation 7
In considering India’s complaint, the ICJ focused its attention on Article 36 of the Convention. It did not take into consideration Article 55 of the Convention, which obliges the officers of the sending state to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state. Although the Article is about immunities and privileges of the consular officers of the sending State, it implicates all Indian consular officers posted in Pakistan as an extension of the Indian state, which appointed Kulbhushan Jadhav to carry out espionage activities in Pakistan, and also issued him a genuine Indian passport under a false alias.

Conclusion
The ICJ ruling of 17 July 2008 adds the following to the international case law:

1.The ACJ can disregard the established principle of customary international law which states that local remedies be fully exhausted before a State brings a case to the ICJ for consideration.

2.Irrespective of the provision in Article 36 paragraph 1B which states that “if he [the accused] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” about his arrest, it is now established by ICJ that the request of the accused, even if not expressed, is always implied under paragraph 1B. 16

3.A State arresting a foreign national is obliged to unconditionally observe Article 36 paragraphs 1A, 1B and 1C of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) regardless of the nature of the accusation, including terrorism and espionage.

Suggestions for Pakistan

While giving full effect to the detailed ruling of the ICJ in its judicial process for the Jadhav case, Pakistan should consider taking the following additional steps with the relevant national and international bodies:

1.Propose to the UN to convene a comprehensive review of the 1963 Convention and its Optional Protocol in the light of the changed nature of international relations, which include, inter alia, misuse of consular premises by sending States to undertake anti-state activities in the receiving State; State-sponsored terrorism through contracted intelligence officers and civilians posing as journalists, businessmen and INGO personnel; spread of terrorism and hatred though social media; inter-state cyber wars; and, cross border illegal financial transactions.

2.Pakistan can also, should it so wish, submit a reservation or declaration to the 1963 Convention stating that it will not consider Article 63:1B binding on the State in instances of foreign nationals arrested for proven terrorist activities or espionage, pending completion of its internal investigation. Such as resolution or declaration should first be passed by the Parliament.

Notes:
1. ICJ ruling. Paragraph 25. Full Text: The remedies requested by India in its final submissions have already been set out (see paragraph 19 above). In summary, India requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Pakistan acted in breach of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Pursuant to the foregoing, India asks the Court to declare that the sentence of Pakistan’s military court is violative of international law and the provisions of the Vienna Convention, and that India is entitled to restitutio in integrum. It also requests the Court to annul the decision of the military court and restrain Pakistan from giving effect to the sentence or conviction, to direct Pakistan to release Mr. Jadhav and to facilitate his safe passage to India. In the alternative, and if the Court were to find that Mr. Jadhav is not to be released, India requests the Court to annul the decision of the military court and restrain Pakistan from giving effect to the sentence awarded by that court. In the further alternative, India asks the Court to direct Pakistan to take steps to annul the decision of the military court. In either event, it requests the Court to direct a trial under ordinary law before civilian courts, after excluding Mr. Jadhav’s confession and in strict conformity with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with full consular access and with a right for India to arrange for Mr. Jadhav’s legal representation.
2. Ibid. Paragraph 135
3. Ibid. Paragraph 130
4. Ibid. Paragraph 147
5. Ibid. Paragraphs 139 & 145
6. Ibid. Full Text of Paragraph 149. The Court, (1) Unanimously, Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the Application filed by the Republic of India on 8 May 2017; (2) By fifteen votes to one [and in all other subsequent paragraphs], Rejects the objections by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the admissibility of the Application of the Republic of India and finds that the Application of the Republic of India is admissible; (3) Finds that, by not informing Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav without delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that provision; (4) Finds that, by not notifying the appropriate consular post of the Republic of India in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan without delay of the detention of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav and thereby depriving the Republic of India of the right to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to the individual concerned, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (5) Finds that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan deprived the Republic of India of the right to communicate with and have access to Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, to visit him in detention and to arrange for his legal representation, and thereby breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (6) Finds that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is under an obligation to inform Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav without further delay of his rights and to provide Indian consular officers access to him in accordance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (7) Finds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to provide, by the means of its own choosing, effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, so as to ensure that full weight is given to the effect of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention, taking account of paragraphs 139, 145 and 146 of this Judgment; (8) Declares that a continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav.
7. Ibid. Paragraph 111
8. Ibid. Paragraph 113
9. Ibid. Paragraph 134
10.Ibid. Paragraphs 141 & 149
11. Ibid. Paragraph 145
12. Ibid. Paragraph 102
13. Point vi of the Agreement on consular access between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the Republic of India. Islamabad, 21 May 2008.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/54471/Part/I-54471-08000002804b7dde.pdf
14. ICJ ruling. Paragraph 96
15. Text of Article 36: Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State.
1.With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2.The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended.
16. Ibid. Paragraph110

London: 18 July 2019

Okey, We Bought Imran Khan’s Dream last July but What’s Next!


By Syed Sharfuddin

Last July I was packing my bags and tidying up my papers to fly to Pakistan. The assignment was to accompany the Commonwealth Observer Group for the 2018 General Election as an independent Political Consultant. While in Pakistan I observed that the dream PTI leader Imran Khan sold to the public for a Naya Pakistan had made deep impact on the mindset and imagination of the middle class, especially women and young persons and those entering the job market. PTI was winning and the electoral campaign said so clearly. Imran Khan had his critics too, most of whom belonged to powerful feudal dynastic families in Sindh and Punjab. They feared for the loss of their own power and privileges in the political Tsunami that was overtaking the length and breadth of the country. The second and third tier of rival politicians who were considered electable in their constituencies, jumped ship and joined PTI. Some of them even got tickets to contest election from PTI platform and some who were not that lucky stood as independents.

I also noticed that the military, which was not interested in manipulating the elections or changing the results of the ballot on the night of the count, and the judiciary which found itself unwillingly caught between the devil and the deep sea with high profiled corruption cases, were both covertly pleased that finally Pakistan was going to take a breath of fresh air with the victory of PTI. The opposition’s allegations of military rigging the election under the pretext of providing security cover were eventually proved false.

The road to PTI victory was not smooth. Coming very lose to election date, and often incomplete, judicial verdicts on the corruption cases of the outgoing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family members and a covert externally-funded global cyber campaign to link the Pakistan military with PTI’s campaign had soured the electoral atmosphere and divided the media which fuelled controversies and conspiracy theories in the traditional fashion of singing the tune of whoever gave them political advertisements and stuffed their pockets, euphemistically called lifafas. Pakistani social media also contributed to this senseless blitz without realising the damage they were doing to the reputation of the country. In this unfortunate discourse Imran Khan unwittingly painted Pakistan as a corrupt and misgoverned country. In the first few months of his Prime Ministership he continued to harp on this narrative in his meetings with foreign dignitaries and overseas investors, little realising that the image that went out to them was of a country they should not trust and stay away from by a barge pole.

Not only the campaign was bitter and conveyed the impression of absence of level playing field, in the night of the poll count the disappointing performance of the results management system which was jointly built by NADRA and ECP, left a bad taste in the mouth regarding Pakistani politicians who remained true to the reputation of not conceding their electoral defeat gracefully.

Following the elections, PTI emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly but it could not secure outright majority in the House, which was another proof that the elections were not rigged. The talk of selected Prime Minister therefore appears both irresponsible and undemocratic indicating lack of faith in the political process which is the result of a parliamentary consensus by politicians themselves. In the provinces, PTI won Punjab and KPK but needed coalition partners in Sindh and Baluchistan to form majority governments.

Since coming to power last year, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan has discovered that governing a country like Pakistan is no mean task. It has also learnt the importance of doing thorough homework before making any political promises because it is only after being in government that a leader comes to appreciate the true state of affairs and the pressures that decide the common denominator in taking national decisions. A perfect example of this is the electoral promise of PTI that it will not go to the IMF for emergency financing, or the claim that the looted money which was illegally sent abroad by corrupt politicians will be repatriated to Pakistan with the help of friendly countries and the international anti-money laundering bodies.

In the last 12 months in which two and a half budgets were given by the government, including the one just passed in the National Assembly, revenue collection has been less than forecasted, inflation is rampant and foreign debt is higher than ever in the history of the country. Despite large injections of cash Dollars amounting to 9 billion, 3 billion each from Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE, the foreign exchange reserves of the country have not been able to prevent the steep fall of the Pakistani Rupee vis-a-vis the US Dollar. The recently signed IMF agreement has come with tough conditionalities calling for radical restructuring of the economy, an overhaul of the revenue collecting apparatus, expansion of income-tax base and putting an end to government subsidies on utilities and food items designed to be poor friendly. The restructuring is taking a toll on the ordinary public, as well as the business sector which has been hit hard by low investments, high import tariffs and a bearish stock market behaviour. Manufacturing has suffered due to high costs of production and utilities, rising interest rates, cuts on export credits, low export yields and disappointing results in the exploration of oil and gas reserves in the country’s potentially promising subterranin fields. Many from the middle class and the poor who expected a quick change in their circumstances are disenchanted and think they made a mistake voting for PTI. The opposition is also not quiet. It keeps flogging the government for every word they say and every bill they bring to parliament to debate and enact.

In this situation, the  military has found a firm place for itself in the major decision-making institutions of the country by becoming members of the country’s key economic bodies, the National Development Council and Economic Advisory Committee. The military is also represented or has visible presence in the National Security Council, National Counter Terrorism Authority, National Disaster Management Authority, Civil Aviation Authority and Airport Security Force which is quite understandable given the security and defence challenges Pakistan faces internally, as well as on its external borders. But while their representation in civilian and political institutions may be good-intentioned and tactically helpful, in the broader context of democratic governance it is an overkill. The reason is because the military enjoys the status of a neutral, non-partisan and credible institution which could act like an A&E call to 911 when needed by civilian government. The military should always stay invisible in the background as a final deterrent to caution inept politicians, and in times of crisis call on them to put things right or else face a mid-term election. The military’s formal institutional presence in the political decision making forums of the country undermines their role as a neutral arbiter and as an insurance policy against disaster.

A number of Pakistanis think that the military is actually running the country from the shoulder of Imran Khan who is Prime Minister only in name. They point to the present harmony in the civil-political relations not as a sign of stability but as the capitulation of civilian authority by the military. These people draw their inspiration from liberal civil society, anti-military and anti-Islam lobbies and friends of India and the Sharifs, some at home (muted) and many overseas (vocal). Irrespective of their intentions, their argument holds ground to the extent that while the military is excellent as a rescuer in a disaster situation, it is unhelpful in governing the country by proxy and taking decisions which dominate, if not bypass, national and provincial political processes in a federation. The hybrid semi democratic rules of Generals Ayub, Zia and Musharraf are seen by many as democracy’s dark periods, each of which kicked Pakistan back into the past instead of leading it to the future.

In many ways Pakistan is today re-living the political history of Bangladesh in the years 2006-2008 during which an extended interim government, covertly supported by the Bangladesh military, cleaned up the mess left by the government of outgoing Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia and paved the way for Awami League to win the December 2008 election and form a government in January 2009. The example of Bangladesh may not be perfect because in Pakistan the interim government lasted only over 2 months and not 2 years. It took office on 1 June 2018 and resigned on 18 August 2018 when Imran Khan was sworn in as Prime Minister. But the fact remains that in the present Pakistan government, which is the third democratic civilian government since General Musharraf gave up power, a press release from DG ISPR carries more weight than a press release from the Ministry of Information or the Prime Minister’s Office. There is no country in South Asia other than Pakistan where the military leadership is given more space in the country’s electronic and print media for news, photos and statements. Even foreign envoys and visiting overseas dignitaries find it necessary to pay a courtesy call on the COAS after calling on the PM or FM. The powerful religious lobby ‘bows’ to no one except the military. DG ISPR’s Twitter account which comments on developments ranging from sports events to development projects, which are purely civilian matters, is run in parallel with the Tweets of some of the more energetic and media-savvy Ministers of the present Cabinet whose job is to keep PTI in the public eye. At least in Bangladesh, after the initial hiccups, the government of Sheikh Hasina took full control of the political process from the military and cleaned up corruption and graft using the parliament and judicial institutions, leading to political stability, investor confidence, rapid economic growth and elimination of extremist voices. Could Pakistan do the same using its elected political capital with precision and come out clean from the muddy waters?

But Pakistan is not Bangladesh. It has its own security threats, political processes and developmental paradigm. It has its friends and its enemies. In a nutshell, Pakistan is personified by its national cricket team which is capable of touching the zenith of success in one match and in another match falling to the ground like a busted missile which is going nowhere. Interestingly, this unpredictability gives Pakistan a unique advantage. Neither its public nor the international players who are interested in this country can completely write off the present government, or the country for that matter, nor can they embrace it fully until the results are final.

It is fair to say that having completed one year out of the mandated five years in its electoral term, it is too soon to judge any government’s performance, let alone that of the PTI government in Pakistan. Therefore the dreamers will have to go on dreaming for at least another couple of years to see whether the austerity measure and resulting economic reforms are working for the country, and whether a Naya Pakistan is finally coming to take shape. While the critics of PTI may continue to boo the government for its shortfalls or gaffes, and while the supporters of this government may continue to applaud every step it takes for better or worse, Prime Minister Imran Khan and his government must be given space and time to do the right things this country needs. After all, Pakistan is only 72 years old in the journey of a thousand years.

7 July 2019.

Background Note:
1. On 28 July 2017, the Pakistan Supreme Court while ruling on the petitions of PTI Chairman Imran Khan, MNA Sheikh Rashid Ahmed and other political leaders, disqualified ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from politics and directed NAB to file three references — Avenfield Properties, Al-Azizia and Flagship Investment — against Nawaz Sharif and other members of his family in the NAB accountability court. 2. On 6 July 2018, an Accountability court of Judge Mohammad Bashir convicted ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the Avenfield Properties reference and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. 3. On 24 December 2018 another Accountability court of Judge Mohammad Arshad Malik convicted Nawaz Sharif in the Al-Azizia reference and awarded him 7 years’ imprisonment, besides imposing fines of Rs1.5 billion and $25 million on the former PML-N leader. 4. In January 2019 the Ex PM’s  legal team filed an appeal, as well as a petition against the decision in the Al Azizia steel mills case. 5. In July 2019 the family of PML(N) which includes the top leadership of the party alleged that the Accountability Court’s Judge Arshad Malik was blackmailed to give a verdict against the ex-Prime Minister under duress. They produced a video clip and an audio recording in support of this allegation. The allegations were refuted by Judge Arshad Malik as false, and based on doctored evidence.

Mr Syed Sharfuddin is a political analyst and a former Pakistani diplomat. He was Special Adviser in the Political Affairs of Commonwealth Secretariat in London from 2000 to 2006, and CEO of Muslim Aid UK from 2010 to 2014.