All posts by Syed Sharfuddin

Mr Syed Sharfuddin is a student of political science and international relations resident in London UK. He has written extensively on democracy and good governance and served in many senior positions as a diplomat, as an international civil servant, as a humanitarian and as an NGO worker. During his career he has held a number of posts. he was previously CEO of Muslim Aid UK www.muslimaid.org; Special Adviser, Political Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, UK www.thecommonwealth.org and a Civil Servant and Diplomat, Pakistan Foreign Service, Government of Pakistan, www.mofa.gov.pk

Yemen Crisis: Who is Involved

Old SanaaMany observers are seeing the ongoing Yemen civil war as a shrewd attempt by Iran to come close to Saudi Arabia’s borders through proxy. They also see the largely GCC-supported military ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ led by Saudi Arabia as an attempt to maintain the power status quo in the region and avoid an AQ & IS advance in Yemen to confront the Shiite-led movement Ansurallah (Houthi). There may be some truth to that analysis but it is not the whole truth. Yemen was ruled by an autocratic President Ali Abdullah Saleh for 33 years who had his own problems with the Houthis. When Ali Abdullah Saleh left power after the ripples of the now extinct Arab Spring reached the shores of Bab El Mandab, the country faced a power vacuum as is often the case with the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Political negotiations which followed Saleh’s departure to write a constitution acceptable to the major stakeholders remained inconclusive. The last straw was the collapse of the National Dialogue Conference initiated in 2013 to work out constitutional arrangements for a government of national unity.

The Houthi movement takes its name from Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who launched an uprising in Yemen in 2004. Its present leader is Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Last September the Houthis captured Sanaa and toppled the widely unpopular transitional government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The peace agreement that was signed for working out a formula for sharing power acceptable to all sides did not hold and fighting broke out in January 2015 resulting in the current civil war.
In the domestic theatre of current fighting, one side is made up of the militias, mostly Sunnis and from the south of Yemen, who are supporting President Hadi who has fled to Saudi Arabia. Fighting against them are most of the Zaydi tribes from the north of Yemen, including the Houthis who are in alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh and his political party. The Houthi-Saleh coalition is an alliance of convenience. The Houthis have access to vast amounts of weapons, warplanes and firearms purchased during the time of Saleh’s rule. They are also assisted by former military advisers who oppose Hadi. In return, Saleh gets a formidable fighting force full of religious zeal and battlefield prowess from the Houthis to destroy the supporters of Hadi who is an enemy of both Saleh and the Houthis. It is believed that Saleh is not fighting to get back to power himself but he wants protection for his life and the wealth he has amassed during his long rule of Yemen.
In addition to the direct confrontation between the Houthis and Hadi supporters, a secessionist movement is also fomenting in the South of Yemen where a socialist-oriented republic existed between 1967 and the late 1980s. Although no statements have been issued by separatists, the flag of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen has been seen flying in some demonstrations prior to the start of the present conflict.
In the regional theatre of the rising smoke of war, on the one side are Sunni-led GCC countries except Oman who are opposing the advance of the Houthis to take over Yemen by force through an unholy alliance with the supporters of the former ruler. On the other side stands Iran as it benefits indirectly from the advance of the Houthi rebels in the south of Yemen by means of expanding its influence in the Arab region and reaching out to the Shiite-Arab population in the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia.
It is noteworthy that to date neither the Chairman of the OIC Summit (Egypt) nor Saudi Arabia which is leading the military strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen has convened an emergency session of the OIC Foreign Ministers on the situation of Yemen. At the 12th OIC Summit in February 2013 the OIC leaders had mentioned Yemen in their Final Communique commending the achievements of the GCC countries to resolve the crisis in Yemen and achieve a peaceful transition to power.
Instead, the situation in Yemen was discussed at the 22-member Arab Summit in Cairo last week (28 March 2015) which endorsed General Sisi’s suggestion to form a Joint Arab Defence Force to meet the challenges facing the Arab wold.
As long as there is use of force, there is little hope that the GCC or UN brokered talks can bring any lasting settlement for the crisis in Yemen and keep it a united country under a democratic constitution and government of national unity.

Islamabad. 1 April 2015.

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Notes for Presentation by Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC QC, Former Foreign Minister of Australia to King Prajadhipok Institute, Bangkok, 3 February 2015. Courtesy Global Leadership Forum Website

http://www.g-l-f.org/index.cfm?id=62090&modex=blogid&modexval=19826&blogid=19826#.VO2E_9K8gJI

 

Professor the Hon Gareth Evans

Personal background as academic constitutional lawyer (5 years); Member of Parliament 21 years (18 upper house, 3 lower); Cabinet Minister 13 years (4 major portfolios, domestic and external); President of International Crisis Group 9 years  (addressing, inter alia, conflict prevention/peacebuilding/transition/ stabilization situations). But acknowledge experience does not always equate to wisdom…

Basic Principles

  • One size does not fit all. No two country situations are alike – history, political culture, religious/ethnic/social diversity. Great care needed in applying experience elsewhere.
  • But certain fundamentals of good governance universally applicable:
  • Legitimacy – representativeness: everyone has significant voice in how governed
  • Accountability – governors sense of responsibility to governed; mechanisms
  • Honesty – no corruption in electoral and governing mechanisms
  • Competence – making good policy, delivering effectively

Institutional Legitimacy, Accountability and Honesty

Core themes

  • Assume for present purposes commitment to some form of representative democracy – where government’s legitimacy based on people having significant voice in who governs. If authoritarian model preferred – e.g. ongoing communist party rule, or military rule – my experience of little relevance.
  • But in devising democratic constitutional system, many imperatives – some competing. Crucial issue in institutional design and management is how you balance them:
  • Government  must be elected by majority – but must govern for all, be sensitive to minority rights, interests and opinions
  • Government must govern for whole country (esp defence, foreign affairs, economic management) – but must be sensitive to different local or regional interests, and the principle of subsidiarity (matters should be handled by lowest or least centralized competent authority)
  • Government must be strong enough (and able to govern for long enough) to deliver on policy imperatives – but not be immune from criticism, pressure or accountability
  • Can be room for trade-offs/compromises in institutional design in addressing these competing imperatives. But no room for any trade-off when it comes to
  • Governing in accordance with the rule of law (not the arbitrary rule of individuals, in which like cases not treated alike) – recognizing that the law itself must be sensitive to the needs and interests of the country as a whole, not just those running the government
  • Governing honestly  -  corruption in the operation of the election system, or the carrying out of any government functions, cannot be tolerated: completely at odds with all principles of democratic governance

Experience/Thoughts

  1. Parliamentary systems (viz. where executive government is determined by the majority vote of elected members, rather than directly elected or appointed) are generally to be preferred to presidential systems

-  avoids paralysis between executive and legislature (cf. US now)

-    better chance of  leader being seen to represent whole country cf. particular region or group   (cf Afghanistan under Karzai)

2.  The best systems of parliamentary government, in my experience, start with electoral rules designed to produce strong and stable governments, but supplement this with necessary checks and balances on how they exercise that power.

3.  It is an illusion to think there is some perfect or ideal electoral system which can simultaneously ensure that the composition of the parliament perfectly reflects voter choices (which proportional representation [PR] systems are designed to do) and that a government can be formed with a stable and workable majority (which majority/plurality systems are designed to do): hard choices always have to be made.

4. The requirement of strength and stability can most easily be met if the electoral system is designed to produce a small number of strong parties in the chamber which elects the government.  Ideally this will be achieved by systems which tend to produce just two major parties alternating in power (ideally of the centre-left and centre-right respectively, giving voters policy and not just personality choices). Strong coalition governments, usually of no more than two parties, are also achievable where the coalition partners bring complementary interests to the government (eg the rural based National Party in Australia which has for decades been in coalition with the Liberal Party, or in Germany the Free Democrats usually in coalition with the Christian Democrats, or the Greens with the Social Democrats).

- What is to be avoided in constitutional design are systems almost guaranteed to produce weak coalition governments of three or more parties. Mixed systems like Germany’s MMP can be designed which are basically proportional, but (by excluding parties with low voter support) enable reasonably strong and stable coalition governments to be relatively easily formed: they are much better than pure PR systems like Israel or Belgium, which make the formation of strong and stable governments a nightmare.

5. The most appropriate such checking and balancing mechanisms in my experience are (a) regular fairly conducted elections at which a bad or unpopular government can be removed; (b) an upper house which places some limits on the government’s freedom of action; (c) a court system able to check outright criminal misuse of power, and to strike down unconstitutional legislation or executive actions; and (d) other independent watchdogs designed to keep the government, parliament and public service honest and disciplined.

6.  Check (a): Regular elections. These should be conducted at no more than 4-yearly intervals, and be conducted with impeccable fairness by an independent electoral commission in which all sides of politics, and all major groups and regions in the country, have complete confidence.

7. Elections should be the only mechanism for removing a bad or poorly performing government: Australia had experience in 1975 of a constitutional coup (in which the Queen’s representative, using formal powers under the Constitution which had long been thought unusable, dismissed an elected government) and the scars lingered for many years. Impeachment processes to secure the removal of political leaders should only be considered in the most extreme cases, where manifest illegality is involved as determined by properly functioning independent courts.

8. The solution to removing a poorly performing populist government is for opposing politicians to provide a better alternative at the next election:  clean, competent, sensitive to wider national interests and the concerns of all major groups and regions in the country, and seeking common ground. As New York Governor Al Smith famously put it in the 1920s, “The only cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy”.

9. Check (b): Upper house. The best upper houses have clear but limited powers, and bring a wider range of voices to bear on government processes than may be reflected in the composition of the executive government of the day.  Ideally they are elected on a proportional representation basis (though with some limits, like a 5% threshold vote requirement) or, if they have an appointed component, do so on the basis of some mechanism which ensures that only persons of genuine experience and stature are chosen.  Upper houses should have no power to block budgetary or other legislation crucial to the survival of the government of the day (a problem with the Australian Senate, which is much too powerful in this respect). And in my view ideally they should be limited (like the House of Lords in the UK) to scrutinising and delaying government legislation, not ultimately defeating it. Upper house committees can and should play an important role in holding governments to account through public hearings and reports, and contributing to the policy debate.

10. Check (c): Courts.  Respect for the rule of law demands the existence of courts and judges universally accepted as independent and beyond reproach. If these conditions are satisfied, political leaders in or out of office should not be immune in any way from criminal prosecution for corruption or other breaches of the criminal law.  But political leaders should never be prosecuted for policy mistakes or errors of judgment: the sanctions for poor government must be political not legal. The role of constitutional courts should be limited to adjudicating on whether legislation or executive action is in breach of specific provisions of the constitution; and those specific provisions should, in turn, be very clearly and  narrowly defined.

11. Check (d): Independent Watchdogs.  The best systems of democratic governance also usually have built into them a variety of additional scrutiny, accountability and reporting mechanisms designed to keep the government, parliament and public service honest and disciplined, e.g. anti-corruption agencies, human rights commissions, and Ombudsman processes.  If these are to be of any use, however, they must be, and be seen to be by everyone, as scrupulously independent and non-partisan

12. Free Speech. Effective democratic governance depends absolutely on the traditional rights of free speech and political association being totally respected, in both law and practice. It is one thing to ban speech or writing which manifestly incites to violence, but quite another to ban speech which merely insults, offends or humiliates: participants in the political process should have thick skins, and governments should earn respect, not try to compel it.  Use of defamation law as a political weapon to silence opponents, as has regularly been the case in Singapore, is at odds with fundamental democratic principles.

13. Devolution of power. The proper distribution of power between central government, and local or regional authorities, is always extremely difficult to get right. Federal systems like Australia, Canada and the US can be an important way of meeting regional needs and aspirations, particularly in the delivery of health, education and welfare services, and in areas like land management and urban planning, but it is important not to concede too much ground. Complex modern societies, strongly internationally interdependent, need much standard setting at the national level, and all the key instruments for effective economic and fiscal management must be available to the national government.

14. At the end of the day even the most elaborately and carefully designed constitutional arrangements cannot guarantee stable and effective democratic governance. That depends ultimately on the prevailing political culture, and the mindsets of those exercising the levers of power.  And even the best constitutional arrangements cannot guarantee competent government: that depends on a whole set of different factors, to which I now turn.
Competent Government

Experience/Thoughts

  • Perhaps the most basic thing I have learned from 13 years as a Cabinet minister and watching many other governments is that there is wisdom in crowds – when leaders go it alone/don’t consult with interest groups and colleagues/don’t pay detailed attention to professional advice before announcing policy initatives, things invariably end in tears. The Hawke-Keating Government ‘83-96 widely seen as gold standard in Australia (certainly as compared with its Labor predecessors and successors Whitlam/Rudd/Gillard, and the non-Labor governments of the ‘60s and ‘70s, and Abbott now, although the Howard non-Labor government of 1996-2007 was also fairly generally respected).  From my own experience in that government I would spell out more specifically five factors – I think applicable to any government anywhere – which are crucial for competent government performance:
  • One: have clear philosophy and sense of policy direction.  Maintained consistently throughout the Hawke-Keating  term:  very dry in our economic policy, very moist in our social policy, and liberal internationalist in our foreign policy, with the concept of the “social wage” – delivered mainly through health, education, superannuation gains – being at the heart of our capacity to sell wage restraint, deregulation, and tough economic reforms generally to the wider community. Rarely let politics drown good policy, certainly in the crucial area of economic policy, because we were confident of the strength and coherence of the policy we were making.
  • Two: have agreed system of internal government management. Coming into office with memories still strong of dysfunction of Whitlam Government, we had developed a structure-and-process blueprint addressing relations between Prime Minister and other Ministers and their respective offices, between Cabinet and Parliamentary Party, between Executive government and public service: lot of attention paid to consultative processes, committee structures, and lines of decision-making authority. The model served the government well, with little modification, for whole 13 years.
  • Three: operate internally on the basis of argument rather than authority. We argued everything out, often very fiercely (and in language which reflected the strength of the views held) and didn’t just succumb passively to the exercise of leadership authority. The Prime Minister may have been first among equals, but only just. Everything was contestable, and contested. The concept of captain’s picks and captain’s calls, after a couple of early mishaps, just didn’t apply. Our leaders didn’t always love the reality of Cabinet peer group pressure, but both of them accepted that they were running a Cabinet, not a presidential, system.
  • Four: listen and consult with relevant industry, profession and community stakeholders, on every major policy issue. We  also respected and welcomed the advice of the public service, not just in policy implementation but in conceptualisation and design, and had at least as many public servants seconded to our ministerial offices as political and personal staff.
  • Five: explain and argue the case for everything the government does. Hawke and Keating both outstanding communicators, remorseless in their determination to ensure that the major opinion-moulders knew what we were trying to do, why and how.  If the focus groups told us we had a problem, that was the beginning of the public argument, not the end of it.

It is true that we didn’t have in the mid-‘80s some of the technology-driven, 24/7 media pressures that present governments are under, or quite so difficult a set of minority parties to have to negotiate with in the upper house.  In all sorts of ways it is now tougher than it has ever been for governments to deliver good policy outcomes. But I’m not persuaded that the problem is wholly a systemic one: it ultimately comes down to intelligent, competent political leadership.

The bottom line, again, is that governments cannot compel the respect of the people: they have to earn it.

Governance and the Role of Citizen – Small State Model

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Five Point Test

Section 1 – Awareness about Elected Government

1.1 Do you follow parliamentary meetings
1.2 Do you follow cabinet meetings
1.3 Do you get involved in public consultations
1.4 Do you have awareness of any recent initiatives or policies of government for economic and social development
1.5 Do you take part in non-governmental organization (NGO) activity

Section 2 – Familiarity with Government Representatives
2.1 Name the President
2 .2 Name the Prime Minister
2.3 Name the leader of a political party
2.4 Name at least one governor or chief minister of a province.
2.5 Name at least one Member of Parliament representing a constituency other than your own.

Section 3 – Knowledge about Government Affairs
3.1 Do you have easy access to your parliamentarian, mayor, councillor, mayor or local representative.
3.2 Can you access government policies and programmes via the government website
3.3 Do you have access to budget information
3.4 Do you have access to information about salary paid to government officials and parliamentarians
3.5 Can you access reports of national public commissions or authorities issued on specific issues

Section 4 – Overall Satisfaction with Government Services
4.1 Satisfied with supply of electric, gas, drinking water and waste collection services
4.2 Satisfied with supply of essential commodities and services
4.3 Satisfied with education facilities
4.4 Satisfied with health facilities
4.5 Satisfied with transport system and roads and railroads

Section 5 – Influence on Government
5.1 Can you influence government policy through legally provided participatory processes.
5.2 Are you free to disagree with government policy without fear of reprisal?
5.3 Can you freely assess government performance without political pressure?
5.4 Do you enjoy freedom of religion, gender, association and expression?
5.5 Do you have any restriction on your movement, property or finances?

Score Key: Each of the above five sections has 5 self-assessment questions. Each affirmative question scores 4 marks. If your answer draws a blank award yourself a zero. Total score over 50 marks means you are politically aware and making your vote go far to keep an eye on the government you have elected to power. However, a zero score to all questions in any section impacts negatively on the overall result and requires subtracting 20 marks from the grand total. Good luck with the test.

Why the Dharna has not Gone Away: A Political Analysis

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Contrary to Government’s assessment that the PTI and PAT public protest in Islamabad which started in August 2014 would have limited shelf-life and will not last beyond a few weeks, the Islamabad dharna – literal meaning in Urdu – stay put – has continued to attract the people and become a family affair beyond the voices of angry young men. If the growing interest in the daily speeches of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qardi are any guide, the protesters do not seem to be going away any soon despite the hot sunny days and monsoon rains of the last two months and the soon-to-come wintery nights of October. Media channels which compete with each other to replace old news with new headlines discovered to their surprise that the most watched channels by Pakistanis in the last few weeks were not entertainment programmes but news channels providing daily coverage to the dharna. Even housewives seem to have forsaken their favourite TV soaps to watch the happenings around the neighbourhood of Islamabad D-Chowk and Blue area on a daily basis. And now the protest is reaching to other cities and is covered live on You Tube, Whats Up, Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and Pinterest by its supporters and critics.
No one in his wildest dreams imagined that soon after the protesters reached Islamabad last August, the Prime Minister will pack up and leave Islamabad and agree to resign from his position, as demanded by PTI and PAT supporters. True that there were a few days in the early phase of the dharna when the role of the armed forces was not clear and the Government suspected the usual trick, namely the third force to usurp its democratic authority. However, after the armed forces made it clear that it was not their business to clean up the mess politicians had made, the Government knew for sure that the dharna will not be able to shake its writ and legitimate authority to govern until the next general election mandated by the constitution.
Despite this reassured position, the Government lost political ground considerably from where it stood in July when the dharna was still in the offing. All the steps it took to address the protest backfired on itself. Events went in favour of PTI and PAT instead of reinforcing the position of the government. The coming together of the main opposition PPP under the already discredited former President did not help build the image of the Prime Minister who was seen dining and feasting his political rival in Lahore and reasserting his legitimate right to govern as the elected prime minister of the country. A major concession granted by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to PTI by establishing a judicial commission to inquire into Imran Khan’s allegations of rigging of 2013 general election was much too late to call off the dharna. The initiative was badly timed and was handled unwisely by the Prime Minister. Even the terms of reference of the commission drafted by the law secretary left much to be desired.

A joint session of parliament convened by the Government to address the points raised by Imran Khan and to a lesser extent by Tahir ul Qadri lingered on for days but regrettably failed to address the main issue. It offered no solution beyond asserting the authority of the parliament as the representative institution of the people. The joint session also ironically exposed the intellectual level of the honourable members of this august house who were watched live by the people of Pakistan fighting their petty battles, making street-wise statements and raising points of order like students in a special measures public school. Barring a few notable exceptions worth admiring, most of the speeches avoided the real issue and kept repeating the known positions of their parties. The joint session confirmed the negative public impression that the people’s representatives are nothing more than the guardians of their own personal egos and party interests in the name of parliamentary sovereignty and public service.
The dharna also took political parties by surprise. The fast momentum of the dharna gave them not enough time to define their respective stand. MQM which is a party of ordinary hard working people could not align itself with PTI despite the fact that both parties challenge the class-based status quo of the country’s decadent political leaders. Both MQM and PTI want to bring a democracy that serves the interests of people instead of their masters. PAT and PTI also could not articulate the terms of their co-habitation despite being parallel strands of similar, if not the same revolutionary movement and ideology. JI which is a coalition partner of PTI in KPK province decided to remain neutral and impartial and even took the role of a mediator between the Government and its KPK ally. The official opposition PPP played a good-cop bad-cop role. On the one hand, PPP leaders of the opposition in the house and senate continued to criticise the Government for the irresponsible and laid back manner in which they handled the crisis from the beginning of the protest, following the Model Town killings in Lahore, till the squatting of PTI and PAT supporters on the Constitutional Avenue in Islamabad. The PPP Don, Mr Asif Zardari and his former Interior Minister Rahman Malik, on the other hand, adopted the good-cop role and threw their weight on the side of the Prime Minister and the Government assuring their support for the continuation of democracy and the present status quo.
The judiciary which has luckily stayed out of any political controversy and is seen as a credible arbiter decided not to use its authority to take suo-motto notice of the situation and give a ruling that could satisfy all concerned in a manner that was within the confines of the constitution and the demands of the protesters. It was surprising that given its record of suo motto notices in the past on small issues, the Supreme Court decided, much like the armed forces that it will not intervene and leave the politicians to clean the mess they have created themselves.
The President, being the commander of the armed forces, a symbol of the federation and an authority that sits as the head of state of the republic was in an ideal position to intervene and mediate between the concerned political actors. However, the President did not stand up to the occasion and did not prove the worth of his coveted high office. To add insult to injury, his Governors in Punjab and Sindh were more visible trying to do something about the crisis even though they are not constitutionally mandated to play this role as supporters of the government in the absence of the President’s initiative to whom they report and represent in their respective provinces.
Negotiations carried out on various tracks for a resolution of the crisis lacked legitimacy and produced confusion but not results. At first the Government did not take PTI and PAT leaders seriously. Then it welcomed the efforts made by JI. Then a government mediation committee was formed in which the Governor of Punjab was also included although he is not represented in the Parliament. Then came the Jirga of Mr Rahman Malik who claimed that his mediation was the most successful and soon people will hear the good news of reconciliation. Finally, it all came to nothing. This shows that either the Government did not take the dialogue seriously or was mislaid by the Sherpas in the political parties who wanted to take credit for their own mediation initiatives. Mr Rahman Malik’s enthusiasm to jump in a row which was initially not PPP’s but was between PML-N and PTI is a clear evidence of this failed approach.
The above answers the question why the Islamabad dharna has not gone away. But more importantly, there are three main reasons for its success: the dharna leaders are speaking the language of the people and they are loving it; the dharna has given people a social platform to get out of their cramped homes every evening and celebrate culture in a country that has no entertainment, no sponsorship of sports and no theatre for the ordinary folks; and the protest has baffled the Government as to what to do next because force has not worked and its benign neglect is being misinterpreted by many as its weakness to act. The Government has also failed to give the impression of business as usual. Foreign investors have cancelled their visits to Pakistan, the economy is suffering huge losses every day and the recent flash floods have also taken their toll on the treasury.
The argument of the protesters for a fundamental change of the governance model is strong and convincing; they have the pulse of the middle-class households, women and youth, as well as the ordinary man on the street whose priority is his wallet and not necessarily the need to walk through the complicated maze of politics. Their speeches are getting better every day despite repetition and are reaching out more to the public, the longer they are staying in Islamabad.
Songs and dance substituting classical police beatings and blood bath in what is seen essentially as a long and arduous struggle for change is a new dimension of the dharna. Instead of making it a dangerous place to be, the dharna has continued to provide a venue for young persons to meet and have fun while their parents watch them from home on their TV screens and some even join them for a break from the hard life of power outages and increasing prices of commodities of daily use. Reminds me of the days when as a young student in Islamabad I joined public protests against President Ayub Khan not knowing why I was saying ‘Go Ayub Go’ and without realising what were to follow after he was gone in 1969.
So far, the Government has decided to ignore the protests but this wilful neglect is seen by PTI and PAT supporters as tacit admission of guilt and denial of reality, especially against the background of the alleged self-serving democracy of the parliament and bad governance of the executive. The attitude of some of the cabinet ministers has been uncharacteristically hostile and they have not convinced the people that they retain the moral high ground to govern, even though they have the legal authority and constitutional backing to remain in power until their full term is served. Combined with this lack lustre performance is the work of government ministries and departments, including provincial governments, parastatals and loss making public corporations which has hardly anything to show as a role model of good public service. There are small exceptions of individual sacrifices and exemplary performances but these are only patches of greens in the large barren hinterland.
What Should the Government do in such circumstances -continue to ignore the dharna and let the economy bleed through its Achilles heel or let go something that resolves the crisis and still gives it the moral and legal authority to call the shots. If I were the Prime Minister who believed that the majority of the people supported his policies of making Pakistan a strong powerhouse of growth and development, I will take the high moral ground of reshuffling the cabinet and announcing fresh elections within 180 days. I would in the meanwhile revamp the election commission and appoint a capable administrator – not a retired judge as tradition dictates – to head it. In the first 90 days I will freeze postings and transfers, put a hold on all new contracts and foreign agreements and focus on elections. I will organise a national census, call local elections, mandate the election commission to update voters’ lists and assign the judiciary and parliament to look into the grievances of the dharna protesters. In the remaining 90 days I would make way for a neutral, impartial and capable caretaker administrator to make arrangements for a fair and independent election for the nation. I would focus on my party leadership and start my campaign in full swing when all other political parties do the same. In 180 days the nation will know who is a genuine leader and who is politicking. But before I do that, I need to have confidence in me that I am a leader and not a follower. I would show the nation that I lead my party and my supporters from the front instead of being led by my advisers and cabinet colleagues, even though taking decisions by consensus is usually a good thing. But leadership in political cul-de-sacs demands leading on time and from the top.
Syed Sharfuddin
London: 28 September 2014

 

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Pakistan Update: Politics of Public Protest

Azadi march

Some countries with whom Pakistan has close political and economic ties and two inter-governmental bodies (the EU and the Commonwealth) have issued public statements on the present political situation in Pakistan. The Parliament and its representative parties are supporting the PML-N government of Mian Nawaz Sharif on the one hand, and on the other hand are two smaller parties which have brought people power to Islamabad in thousands who are now displaying their prowess in front of the sensitive institutions in Islamabad for over a week.

These overseas statements range from standard diplomatic expressions of concern to clear messages of advice and caution aimed at certain quarters. They all, however, stress one point that the issues must be resolved politically and peacefully without giving any room to the military to repeat the events of 1999 when the elected government of PM Nawaz Sharif was removed by General Musharraf on charges of bad governance. Statements from political parties and civil society within Pakistan bear the same headlines and contents with varying degrees and local flavours.

The arguments advanced by both sides of the political divide are clear and make sense when seen in the context of good democratic governance. But what will happen next and how this deadlock will be resolved is still an open question. The two protesting parties (PTI which has representation in the National Assembly and governs one province – KPK) & PAT (which has no presence in parliament but is led by a motivational preacher cum scholar) allege that it is their constitutional right to stage protests and demand PM’s resignation. Their main argument in support of their demand is that the last elections were massively irregular or rigged and all doors available to them in the system which they have been knocking have remain closed without any response. One of the two protesting parties (PAT) goes further than this demand – it is asking for a complete overhaul of the electoral system, full implementation of Constitution in regard to State responsibilities, review of the rules of business of the Executive and devolution of the Judiciary down to village level to make justice available at the doorsteps of the common man. Together, they have around 50,000 protesters comprising families, women and children who are staging sit-in in front of Parliament since last week. Even though the figure of protesters fluctuates in day and night time and many take breaks to sleep at home and freshen up, the presence of so many people in the open grounds of Islamabad’s most sensitive roads in close proximity to the cordoned off diplomatic enclave poses a serious security risk for all. Violence cannot be ruled out because the speeches have been fire brand and full of emotion which can cause a mass surge on PM House and adjoining government buildings. A police crack-down on the protesters is also possible from the government to end the sit-in and disperse crowds. Better police management and patience and flexibility on both sides have helped keep peace but there have also been tense moments. Last but not the least there is the threat of a terrorist attack by Taliban to take advantage of the situation and force the army to take over the government. Their aim will be to engage the army on many fronts and weaken its hold on the ongoing military Zarbe Azb operation currently under-way in the tribal areas of Pakistan which have provided safe havens to the terrorists. Of all the options, this scenario is the worst and will invoke Pakistan’s suspension from the Commonwealth once again.

The government, on the other hand, is justified in saying that all solutions must be found through dialogue and within the Constitution and Parliament. The Parliament for now is not in favour of any mid-term election nor is it in favour of an in-house change of PM. The second largest party in Parliament, the PPP is issuing vague statements – the party supports the Constitution and parliamentary processes but it is highly critical of the way the government has mishandled the protests. The PPP will be politically strengthened if the ruling PML-N in the Centre and in the Province of Punjab (Pakistan’s largest and in many ways trend setting province) comes out bruised and weakened from the crisis or if the government of PM NS is wound up under duress, creating once again a situation where an elected PM is robbed of his 5-year electoral mandate so early in his term. Ironically, PM NS has no record of good governance to defend himself but he has the electoral mandate and the Constitution on his side. He also has the support of provincial governments and smaller political parties. The civil society is however divided on the verdict and so is the media.

The protesting marches have been fed adrenal-soaked speeches every few hours and it is very hard for the two leaders of PTI and PAT to slow down the momentum they have generated in the marches thus far. It is inconceivable that without any major political gain they will take a reverse drive to cool down on their own. One positive factor is the introduction of folk songs and home learnt dances to keep people entertained in a city which is otherwise socially infertile and entertainment starved as far as ordinary people are concerned. However, it is also a clever ploy by PTI and PAT to keep their crowds in situ, without causing significant reduction in their numbers.

Within Pakistan, there are only three forces who can defuse the crisis – the President, but everyone knows he has no political personality nor any prowess to act as a credible arbiter. The second force is the army which has learnt its lessons in the past and is guided by ground realities and external signals of disapproval and is wisely not in a hurry to intervene. The army also thinks that by bailing out PM NS from this crisis, they can expect more cooperation from PML-N government in the future. Until recently, the army has had a rocky relationship with PML-N government on the issue of General Musharraf’s trial, relations with India and launching the military operation in North Waziristan.

The third and final force is the judiciary. The CJ could have ended the protest by ordering a high-level judicial inquiry into the allegations of election fraud and given the ruling that, if proven, a mid-term election under a caretaker government will become mandatory. This has not happened because there is a serious trust deficit between the protesting parties and the government and they suspect that PM NS and his hawkish ministers will prevail upon the new commission to prevent a transparent and fair investigation. Ironically, the TORs of the commission which was requested by the government from the CJ have been drafted by the law ministry in haste without giving much thought to the larger issue and are likely to be rejected by those opposition political parties which are directly concerned with it.

Under the circumstances it makes good sense to seek external support from those inter-governmental institutions which specialise in democracy, election observation and democratic reforms. The organisation which is closest to Pakistan and has no conflict of interest whatsoever is the Commonwealth. It has a mechanism to offer Commonwealth good offices to countries which face internal conflicts arising between political parties or democratic institutions. The Commonwealth also has a built in mechanism to suspend countries which are under military rule. The Commonwealth has the ability to talk to all stakeholders as an impartial and neutral arbiter and fill in the trust deficit. The Commonwealth could make a suggestion to both sides that the commission requested by the government to investigate the vote rigging allegations could be overseen by a group of independent Commonwealth observers drawn from selected countries who will complete their work within an agreed deadline. If such a role is accepted both by the government and by other political parties, in particular PTI and PAT, the protests can end on the mutual understanding by all parties that if the commission finds a pattern of serious and persistent rigging in a large number of constituencies, the government will immediately call mid-term elections under a neutral administration. If on the other hand the commission finds that the level of irregularities is small and is consistent with what normally happens in other Commonwealth elections without any evidence of systematic fraud, then there will be no mid-tern elections and no resignations and PML-N will have a full 5-year term without further street protests.

If Commonwealth good offices are requested by the government and are accepted by the London based organisation, this will be a win-win for all because at the moment there is no one in the country who could be seen to be neutral other than the three forces which are mentioned above but each has a problem which prevents it to act decisively.

The only other alternative is use of force by either the government or the protesters which will be disastrous if there are large number of casualties either by accident or by design of the agent provocateurs, or if the army moves in as a recourse of last resort. The TTP would also want the military to get distracted and loosen its grip on the operation in North Waziristan. As Interior Minister has repeatedly said, the terrorist threat is real and imminent; it cannot be dismissed lightly.
Syed Sharfuddin
22-08-2014
The writer is a former Pakistan diplomat and a former Special Adviser at the Commonwealth Secretariat London.

Azadi march 2

Scorched Earth

The Trouble with Caretaker Government

SharafThe idea of holding free and fair elections under a neutral caretaker government sounds attractive for two reasons: a level playing field for all contestants and an administration which is entirely neutral safeguarding the integrity of the ballot. Both these assumptions, even though well-intentioned, have adverse implications for the future of democracy.

Appointment of a caretaker administration implies that the incumbent government does not enjoy the confidence of political parties for facilitating a free and fair election and should resign before the poll. In developed democracies, there is no concept of swearing in a caretaker government to conduct the immediately following general election. The outgoing government remains in office until such time elections have been held and a new parliament is formed, although such governments do not take policy decisions nor act in a manner that may impact on the function of the new administration.The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan envisaged a similar setup for the conduct of general elections. However, the death of General Zia in 1988 and subsequent dismissals of governments in the 1990s under Article 58-2(b) necessitated the formation of caretaker governments to oversee fresh elections. Regrettably, the elections conducted by those caretaker administrations did not result in setting any high standards which should justify the continuation of this practice. No election in Pakistan has been without controversy.

The caretaker clause in Article 224 of the Constitution, which was introduced by the military government under the LFO of 2002, allows the president and the governors in the provinces to appoint caretaker governments and cabinets without any defined parameters. The only restriction imposed is on the caretaker prime minister and the chief ministers who are not eligible to contest the immediately following election of such assemblies.

Caretaker governments are usually a feature of new democracies or countries coming out of the shadows of a civil war. Pakistan does not fall in either category. Pakistan’s democratic institutions are fairly developed and its political parties and civil society have a degree of sophistication which is comparable to that of advanced democracies.

Another difficulty with caretaker cabinets is that these are not responsible to anyone except the president or the governors in the provinces. If the president becomes controversial in an election, the credibility of the entire caretaker government is at stake.

Like other issues in democracy, elections are a process of acquiring maturity over time. If anything requires strengthening it is the power of the election commission to conduct a fair election and prevent abuse of power or authority by those not authorised to exercise it under law. It should be ensured that the army, police and the bureaucracy are placed at the disposal of the election commission.

Those cabinet ministers who intend to actively support their party candidates or those who themselves wish to contest the election should not be allowed to misuse government vehicles, property, staff and funds for the campaign. The challenge of democracy lies in accepting responsibility and following the rules; not by keeping the practitioners of democracy insulated from the reality of politics.Whatever the outcome of the popular vote, it should be respected in the true spirit of democracy and the Constitution. Even a hung parliament deserves the right to be given a chance to cobble together fragile coalitions. Democracy comes stronger with such experiences. Artificial solutions based on expediency actually harm democracy in the long run.

If a national consensus is not developed to show zero tolerance for electoral fraud and polling irregularities, and a culture of honesty and integrity is not promoted actively, a caretaker cabinet or government, howsoever neutral and honest, can do very little to reverse the systematic rigging of elections. Bangladesh offers living proof of the limitations which undermine public confidence in the caretaker government’s ability to conduct a transparent and credible election.

What is more important is a level playing field for all political parties, a state broadcaster which allocates equal time and coverage to all contestants, a community of media which sets its own codes of conduct for the coverage of election, a civil service which is completely apolitical and an election commission which is financially and administratively autonomous and enjoys the confidence of political parties and civil society.

What is also important is an electorate which is free from violence and intimidation to express its will on the day of the poll, without ghost voters lurking in the electoral rolls or stuffed ballot papers found in the boxes irrespective of whether these are transparent or opaque.

A caretaker government can never be a replacement for these important features of a free and transparent election, even if that cabinet is truly committed to its goals.

The tradition of appointing a chief election commissioner from the judiciary also needs to be reviewed. In India, the post of the chief election commissioner is regarded as an administrative position because elections require constant administrative supervision and management. The judiciary performs a highly specialised function. It interprets laws enacted by the parliament and also decides on issues of law when disputes are brought before it for a ruling.

The argument that a senior judge has the ability to interpret electoral laws better than a civil servant does not hold much ground because 90 per cent of the work of the chief election commissioner is about the management and administration of elections, and only 10 per cent is concerned with the framing of electoral laws and their interpretation. Besides, a chief election commissioner can always appoint a senior lawyer as a member of the commission, or request a court to interpret a law if there is doubt on its application in the context of elections.

An election commission which is headed by a judge of a superior court cannot substitute the court itself. Any person can challenge the decisions of the election commission before the higher judiciary. That being the case, it makes sense not to appoint the head of the election commission from the judiciary. What we need is a complete separation of powers.

The 1973 Constitution, as amended by the LFO, provides for a caretaker government to supervise the next election. It is a foregone conclusion that after the assemblies are dissolved on completion of their term in November, the present government would leave office and a new caretaker administration would be formed.

In ideal circumstances, this should not be the case. Article 224 deserves to be rewritten to recapture the spirit of the 1973 Constitution. This would be yet another step towards restoring full democracy in Pakistan.

This article was published by the author in the daily Dawn on 22 October 2007. http://m.dawn.com/news/1070581/dawn-opinion-october-22-2007

chaar Minaar

Roots of 2007 Judicial Crisis in Pakistan

SharafCompared to other democracies, Pakistan has never been a shining star in upholding the principle of the independence of the judiciary. The reasons for this underperformance are similar to those found in many developing countries and include poverty, backwardness and lack of trained and qualified judges to impart justice to large sections of the population. Those who lose out on justice are mostly women and other vulnerable social groups.

Despite recent efforts to improve the image of the judiciary in Pakistan, thousands of cases are pending in courts. However, the biggest and foremost reason for the judiciary’s poor performance is the constant interference by the executive in the affairs of the judiciary.

This interference started early in the life of the country when the then president and martial law administrator required the judiciary to take a fresh oath of office swearing allegiance to the emergency provisions leading to the military takeover of the country in 1958. This was important because while the military coup eliminated two branches of government — the legislature and executive — it did not otherwise affect the judiciary. The only way the judiciary could be neutralised by a military regime was to make the senior judges subservient to the executive and prevent them from challenging the legitimacy of the coup and other extra-constitutional measures required to run the affairs of the state under military rule.

After initial resistance to the political events in 1958, the judiciary succumbed to the pressure and accepted the argument that if it did not compromise with the situation, military courts would replace civilian courts in all spheres of the judiciary. In order to continue their jurisdiction over criminal and civilian matters without questioning the politics of the day, the judiciary decided to go along with the requirement of taking an oath of allegiance to the military dictator.

The judiciary’s validation of the coup which was applied in the State v Dosso case in 1958 was so potent that three African countries in the Commonwealth borrowed it subsequently to validate the abrogation of their constitutions by the military. Later, the Dosso reasoning was replaced by the ‘doctrine of state necessity’.

This entente cordiale between the military regimes and the judiciary proved mutually rewarding. The judiciary could continue functioning without interruption as long as it did not question the actions of the military regime. The military rulers, on the other hand, could claim that not all was taken over by them and that the courts were free to dispense justice to society without fear or favour.

Following the military overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1999 in Pakistan, the senior judiciary was again asked to take an oath of allegiance to the military chief executive. Those who dissented, like Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, had to step aside. Subsequently, the Constitution (17th amendment) act 2003, declared that all laws, rules and orders issued under the military government were deemed to have been made in accordance with the Constitution.

The country has paid a high price in terms of its image abroad as the oath of allegiance of the senior judiciary remains a big obstacle in convincing the world that Pakistan’s judiciary is truly independent of the executive. The present episode is perhaps the first time in the history of Pakistan when the judiciary seems to be exerting its independence vis-à-vis an executive which is beginning to acquire more and more powers despite the lip service paid to the theory of checks and balances.

Under the Commonwealth Latimer House principles, Pakistan is morally and politically bound to ensure and respect the separation of powers and independence of action between the three branches of government – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

The announcement made on behalf of the Supreme Judicial Council that the electronic and press media should be careful in discussing a matter which is ‘sub-judice’ makes matters worse for the government. In this age of the internet, the government cannot prevent foreign newspapers and TV channels from commenting on the drama which is being played out in the streets of Islamabad.

In normal circumstances, the Chief Justice, upon hearing about the charges against him from the president, should have himself announced that in view of the allegations against him, he was proceeding on leave pending the outcome of an inquiry by the Supreme Judicial Council. But the rapid action that followed Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s meeting with the president last Friday and his subsequent protective custody and ‘isolation’ by the security agencies led to suspicions that the government was fed up with his bold and fearless demeanour in taking suo motu notices. The chief justice had spoken about many social issues which are highly objectionable and serious in magnitude but which were never brought for legislation in parliament or if these were already covered by laws, were not fully enforced by the government.

Two recent examples of the chief justice’s suo motu notices are his ban on kite flying and expression of concern on the temporary ‘disappearance’ of people. Both actions did not go down well with the government. The Punjab government lifted the kite flying ban for two days and as a result of the death of 13 persons in unfortunate incidents is now faced with possible court cases from the affected families. The ‘disappearance’ of persons has more serious overtones because it infringes on the human rights of people.

From the point of view of the government, surprise custody of suspected individuals for questioning may be necessary to round up terrorists. It is true that Pakistan has a very important role to play in combating terrorism and that it has to show a constantly rising graph in its performance on the war on terror to keep Washington satisfied. But it is also the responsibility of the government to ensure that there is a proper balance between domestic law enforcement and human rights. All other countries of the world which have joined the war against terror have observed this balance.

Normally it is not the function of the apex court to keep issuing suo motu notices to bring about societal change. But if the Chief Justice tried to translate into action the president’s vision for a fair and just society, why should he be punished for bringing about a positive change?

It is argued that the procedure set out in clauses four, five and six of Article 209 has not been followed chronologically. Clause 5 (b) of Article 209 gives the president the authority to direct the council to inquire into the matter of misconduct but it does not give the president the power to remove or make ‘non-functional’ the concerned judge of the Supreme Court or a high court until the condition in clause 6 of Article 209 has been fully met.

The government order preventing Justice Chaudhry from performing his duties on charges of misconduct raises two fundamental questions on the application of the rule of law. The first is denial of his constitutional right to continue as Chief Justice until he is proven guilty of the charges laid against him; and the second is correctness of the composition of the body holding the inquiry against the Chief Justice in accordance with the Constitution. The present composition of the Supreme Judicial Council is without the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court after the Chief Justice.

The next senior-most judge is Justice Rana Bhagwandas. His membership of the Supreme Judicial Council is mandatory in accordance with clause 3 (a) of Article 209. Even if the president had asked the judiciary to invoke Article 209 against Justice Chaudhry, the other members of the council should have consulted Justice Bhagwandas on telephone about the date of its meeting and confirmed his participation. Sadly, this does not seem to have happened because the council met on March 13 without Justice Bhagwandas.

Although the events surrounding this interesting judicial case are not a surprise to people who have followed closely the circular email of a Supreme Court advocate, Naeem Bokhari, the action that the executive took last week was too harsh and too hasty. Stopping the Chief Justice from performing his duties with immediate effect on the basis of a letter, even if the letter contained hard facts, is not good practice.

If letters alone can form the basis of determining the fate of highly-placed people in public office, it may be recalled that last year a dozen intellectuals, former politicians and retired generals wrote an open letter to the president warning him of the dangers of continuing both as president and army chief, in the interest of the nation and for the stability, unity and consolidation of democracy in the country. The president ignored that letter, perhaps rightly so because in the affairs of the state, such letters do not mean anything.

If on the basis of the inquiry of the Supreme Judicial Council it is determined by a majority vote that Justice Chaudhry is not guilty of misconduct, can anyone imagine the embarrassment it will bring to the government? Will the president be then prepared to resign admitting an error of judgement in referring Justice Chaudhry’s case to the Supreme Judicial Council?

Moreover, if this government has taken the high moral ground that previous governments were so autocratic that they did not even spare the institution of the judiciary by forcing Sajjad Ali Shah to resign or by masterminding a physical attack on the Supreme Court, how can it defend this action which to outsiders appears similar to earlier assaults on the judiciary? The removal of the Chief Justice will clearly be seen abroad as an indication that in an election year the government wants to ensure that he is not a threat to their plans to re-elect the president in uniform and win the elections for the ruling party.

Whatever the Supreme Judicial Council decides on the reference is its constitutional duty and right. But people will be curious about the details of how the inquiry is conducted. They might also support Justice Chaudhry’s request for a public inquiry.

What is at stake is not the judicial process or the issue of transparency because there are instances where inquiries have been held in camera. What is important is that the Council also looks at the record of Justice Chaudhry’s professional performance. How much harm or good have his judicial verdicts and suo motu notices brought to the country? How far has he been instrumental in restoring the independence of the judiciary? Has he inspired his juniors in the profession to be bold and fearless in dispensing justice for the public good?

After all, none of us can claim to be a saint. If Justice Chaudhry has any vanity or personal flaws, did these come in the way of him being a responsible, bold and fair Chief Justice? Judging from the public enthusiasm and media commentaries that this case has generated, it is indeed a golden opportunity for the judiciary to set the direction of its future which the infamous Dosso case turned away from nearly half a century ago.

This article was published by the author in the daily Dawn of Pakistan on 15 March 2007. www.dawn.com/news/1069923/dawn-opinion-march-15-2007

Islamabad

An Exit Strategy for the Military

SharafMilitary regimes are quintessentially patriotic and unforgiving on the question of national ideology. While they mean well for their country, their understanding of the complex political issues is always limited and their record of performance often falls short of declarations.

Military regimes see democracy as a means of managing political turbulence, and not as an organic institution addressing the needs of a sustainable pluralistic society. They associate themselves with the stability and strength of the state in the fashion of l’état c’est moi. Any criticism of the military regime is seen not as an audit of the government but as an attack on the state itself.

Under military rule, the state is both too strong and too weak. A military regime continuously tries to make the state stronger. The regime also has an insatiable appetite to control and improve governance. It tries to collect more taxes, clamps hard on dissent and uses force to resolve intricate political issues. States under military regimes are inherently weak because they lack a genuine functioning democracy.

The history of military rule in Pakistan is, however, not as gloomy as often painted. In its 60 years of independence, four of Pakistan’s presidents came while serving in the army. Compared to this period, Nigeria has had more coups than Pakistan and none of its military rulers did as much for the country’s economic development as the generals in Pakistan. In Argentina during 1930 to 1983 (a total of 53 years) 14 military presidents governed the country. It is not unrealistic, therefore, to expect that Pakistan will eventually move to a civilian democratic rule without military interference.

The question arises about how to find an exit strategy for a military regime, irrespective of whether it is directly involved in politics or is using proxy parties to leave political power to a successor regime which is genuinely democratic.

The first is the scenario of a military regime going to war with another country and facing defeat, including foreign occupation. This happened in Japan after the Second World War; in Pakistan after the emergence of Bangladesh; in Greece in 1974 when to safeguard the institutional unity and prestige of the army, a faction of the senior military officers overthrew the losing junta and handed over power to a civilian caretaker government; and in Argentina where a similar defeat at the hands of the British in the Falklands war led to elections and a change of guard in 1983.

The second is the scenario of a military regime being so corrupt that even the country’s armed forces feel embarrassed about it and withdraw from power when an opportunity presents itself for change. This is precisely what happened in Nigeria when after the sudden death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, his successor, General Abdul Salami Abubakar, organised free and transparent elections in Nigeria within one year of his presidency and transferred power to an elected president.

The problem with this scenario is that not all military regimes are corrupt. In fact some are cleaner and far more responsible than the democratic administrations they replaced. General Mobutu’s notorious and incompetent reign brought as much tragedy to the former Zaire as has President Mugabe’s misrule to Zimbabwe. Ironically, Mugabe has won successive elections in his country and is not a commissioned military officer, even though he fought the war of Zimbabwe’s independence in the trenches as a comrade.

The general dissatisfaction of people against inefficiency and bad governance by an elected government in Fiji led to a military takeover in 2006 which could well have been avoided if the warning signs were read and addressed in time by the civilian government. It was also the same story that led to the 1999 coup in Pakistan.

Another scenario in the exit strategy is free and transparent elections in which the military agrees to give up power if the parties that support the regime lose the election. In doing so, the outgoing military regimes ensure that legal formalities are completed before their departure to deprive the successor democratic governments of a chance to question the laws and ordinances promulgated during military rule. This scenario applied to Uganda and Chile in the 1980s, and to Pakistan in 2003 when parliament incorporated a major portion of the Legal Framework Order in the 1973 Constitution under the Seventeenth Amendment.Sometimes a military regime may hold elections but in the aftermath of the results not being to its liking, bar the winning party from taking power. This was witnessed in the Burmese elections in 1990. In 1992, the Algerian military invalidated the first democratic elections because the party that won the majority was not ‘kosher’ by the army’s standards.

This volte-face results in weak democracies where the army is not reconciled fully to an entrenched democratic process.

There are examples of countries which had a weak tradition of democracy, such as South Korea and Taiwan, going to elections with military-backed parties and retaining power through free elections.

In this process, the military-backed parties subsequently went through political renewal and became considerably independent over time having a civilian leader, as in Taiwan. After two successive elections, the military-backed parties ultimately lost the majority in these countries and the military accepted the verdict of the people in a democratic process they could not control.

Another scenario that is not entirely democratic but allows the military to leave politics in return for a limited institutional role in the governance structure is made possible through a constitutional arrangement assuring the military a number of seats in the legislature.

The Ugandan constitution, for instance, allows the army to send a fixed number of officers to parliament under a reserved quota for the armed forces.

Pakistan has also sought to give the military an institutional role in politics through the introduction of the National Security Council which includes on its membership the chiefs of the three armed forces as well as the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff committee. Although the NSC is a forum for consultation, it is regarded by the opposition political parties as an unnecessary extension of the parliamentary process.

In countries coming out from the shadow of military rule, the transition to democracy takes place in two phases. In the first phase, multi-party elections result in the formation of civilian governments. These governments either retain an allegiance to their military predecessors or exhibit signs of authoritarianism which they experienced in their political struggle under the military regime.

Sometimes in the first phase of democracy a handful of powerful people exercise control over the political process and economic decision-making in the form of an oligarchy.

Democracy’s second phase is about recognising the political division of labour and respecting professional and institutional specialisations. The more specialised a body politic, the greater chances there are for it to become a stronger democracy.Specialisations lead to checks and balances. These include separation of powers between the three branches of government; separation of religion and state in all spheres of political, economic and social activity; separation of civil society from government; separation of elected representatives in the legislature and the executive from the partisans of those bodies who elect or replace them; separation of responsibilities and functions between the national government and local governments; and separation of facts from values and the vision a country has for its future.

These separations are also sometimes referred to as functional competencies. Under this arrangement, national parliaments delegate more powers to expert administrative bodies in the areas of their competence, but with due public oversight and a strict accountability regime. The acquiescence by parliament gives these bodies sufficient democratic legitimacy to function independently.

Applying this principle to new democracies, especially those in the first stage of transition, one can build a model of democracy where parliament can entrust the armed forces with certain nation-building tasks where they have a comparative advantage over the civilian sector; i.e. building new cities, developing communications infrastructure, supporting the industrial base with R&D and filling the gaps in the security, supply and knowledge sectors in society. The military establishment can thus become an invaluable tool of development while remaining subservient to the institutions of democracy.

This article was published by the author in the daily Dawn of 12 June 2007. www.dawn.com

A Standard Commonwealth Meeting Room

Commonwealth Mechanisms for Democracy and Human Rights Compliance by Member States

SharafThis briefing paper was presented by Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/ at the Commonwealth People’s Forum, held in parallel with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kampala, Uganda in 2007. It covers the first ten years of CMAG’s history.

The Commonwealth has a number of compliance mechanisms which monitor the progress of human rights and democratic governance in member countries. The Commonwealth is perhaps the only international organisation which has the mandate to publicly express concern on serious or persistent violations of democratic principles in a member country, and take appropriate measures to reverse such derogation without being accused of interfering in the internal affairs of states.

The Commonwealth’s most formal mechanism for assessing member countries’ compliance with the Harare Principles is the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) which is constituted by Commonwealth Heads of Government every two years. CMAG has the power to suspend countries from the councils of the Commonwealth if circumstances require such extreme measure, without waiting for formal endorsement from Heads of Government.

CMAG also has the power to readmit a suspended member in the Commonwealth without seeking Leaders’ approval, if it is satisfied that the concerned country meets the Harare benchmarks fully.

Despite some apparent setbacks in a few countries that violated the Harare Commonwealth Principles, namely Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Fiji Islands, as well as its long engagement with The Gambia, Maldives and Cameroon for democratic and electoral reform, which is yet to bear fruit, the Commonwealth has come out stronger and consistent in implementing its rules of engagement. These mechanisms, which are broadly classified as formal and informal, can be further refined and made effective through greater co-ordination within the Commonwealth family involving the Commonwealth inter- governmental bodies, Commonwealth accredited organisations and Commonwealth civil society organisations.

The Commonwealth remains the most effective organisation for pooling resources and involving governments, NGOs and media as partners in democracy and development.

Introduction

Constitutional guarantees for individual liberty and fundamental freedoms, backed by a strong and independent judiciary are an essential feature of democratic societies. Commonwealth countries’ commitment to the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth, and in particular the Harare Commonwealth Principles, is rooted in this principle. The task of deepening democracy and institution building is not possible without taking into account the role citizens play in democratic governance and the freedoms they enjoy in exercising their rights without any unlawful restrictions imposed on them by the state, institution, group or individual.

Commonwealth Heads of Government have resolved in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration and subsequent CHOGM Declarations to abide by their commitment to democracy and the rule of law and other fundamental values. They have also agreed to place their governments under certain compliance mechanisms which are collectively administered by the Commonwealth and guide the work of the association in advancing human rights in member countries.

1. INFORMAL MECHANISMS

1.1. Role of Commonwealth Agencies and Organisations

A number of Commonwealth accredited organisations such as the CPA, CLGF and CAPAM pursue their activities in the overall context of the Harare Commonwealth Principles. Although these organisations work quietly and often in their own specialised areas, they identify and promote good practice in human rights, gender equality, democratic pluralism, decentralisation and devolution and liberal democracy.

1.2. Civil Society Networks

The Commonwealth Foundation is responsible for coordinating the activities of professional associations and civil society organisations in member countries. The Foundation’s work is supported by a number of independent Commonwealth civil society organisations which focus in specific areas, such as the CHRI in human rights, and CTUC in trade union issues.

1.3. Commonwealth Media

Commonwealth media organisations, in particular the CBA, CPU and CJA have helped to free media from government control and provided training to media personnel in member countries. Media freedom is an important component of democracy and human rights.

1.4. Commonwealth Academic Institutions and Think Tanks.

Commonwealth universities and think tanks such as the CPSU have made a valuable contribution in generating fresh ideas to constantly test the relevance of the Commonwealth in modern times. They have defined the vision of the Commonwealth as an association working to empower people, promote fundamental freedoms and create economic opportunity in a globalised world.

2. FORMAL MECHANISMS

2.1. Good Offices Work of the Commonwealth Secretary- General for conflict prevention and resolution.

At the Coolum CHOGM, Commonwealth Heads of Government reiterated their commitment to strengthening the good offices role of the Secretary-General in supporting democratic practice, resolving tensions, conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict rebuilding.

Under present arrangements, it is not possible for CMAG to formally discuss a country where the Secretary-General’s good offices role is ongoing. CMAG can only intervene if the good offices do not resulted in any tangible progress on compliance with the Harare Principles. This places the Commonwealth Secretary-General in a sensitive position. If a period of two years could be set as the upper limit for good offices, CMAG could directly engage with these countries by placing them on its agenda after this deadline.

By its very nature, the Commonwealth good offices process for conflict resolution is unpredictable and has no end date. During this period, if the fundamental human rights

2.2. The Commonwealth Secretariat

The Commonwealth Secretariat has several programmes for deepening democracy and promoting human rights in member countries which are overseen by the Human Rights Unit and the Political Affairs Division. In addition, a number of other Divisions provide support for the Secretary General’s good offices role and assist member countries in institution building and reform.

The Commonwealth Secretariat also builds strategic partnerships with other Commonwealth bodies and institutions, as well as with regional and international organisations to coordinate its work in conflict resolution, local government reform, parliamentary good practice, election observation, human rights, gender mainstreaming and legal and constitutional reform in member countries.

2.3. Special Envoys

The Secretary-General’s good offices involve the appointment of Special Envoys who assist the process of negotiations and consensus building in times of crisis and/or serious violation of Harare Principles. Special Envoys have also been appointed when member countries request assistance for resolving internal conflict or overseeing constitutional and electoral reform. A meeting of Special Envoys was held in London in 2006 to review the Commonwealth’s ongoing work and draw up lessons from their collective experiences.

The work of the Special Envoys is not easy. It is also complicated by the fact that Special Envoys are not authorised to make any commitment on behalf of the Commonwealth for technical assistance

for capacity building or development projects. This reduces the ability of Special Envoys to press for early action.

Special Envoys are also sometimes not available on a full time basis to pursue the good offices mandate in a sustained manner.

2.4. Commonwealth Election Observers

Election observation has been a flagship of the Commonwealth’s democracy and human rights programme for over fifteen years. It has provided the basis for further engagement with member governments for technical assistance for capacity building for the electoral management body, for introducing good offices and for providing vital reports to CMAG on the basis of which the Group has sometimes suspended countries from the councils of the Commonwealth.

2.5. CHOGM and Commonwealth Ministerial Meetings

The Commonwealth has taken failing countries to task through public statements of disapproval as well as through suspension from membership if they repeatedly fall short of their commitments on democracy, human rights, rule of law and separation of powers.

The Commonwealth’s disapproval of states’ non-performance on human rights goes much further than the steps taken by any of the international organisations, including the UN. Although Commonwealth Foreign Ministers have met annually since 2002, the body that has the direct mandate from Heads of Government to act as the custodian of Commonwealth’s fundamental political values is the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG).

Although Heads of Government have given CMAG full powers in regard to taking appropriate measures, including imposition or lifting of suspension, they have sometimes taken matters outside the remit of CMAG as happened in the case of Zimbabwe when they decided to set up a Troika to deal with Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the Troika was expanded and became a Committee of Six Prime Ministers to deal with the Zimbabwe issue. Generally, Heads of Government have rarely interfered with the work of CMAG and endorsed its decisions.

2.6. CHOGM Chairperson-in-Office

Since the Coolum CHOGM, CMAG has also benefited from the contribution of the Chairperson in Office, whose representative is on the membership of the Group. The Secretary-General also consults the Chairperson in Office on good offices.

The role of the Chairperson in Office between one CHOGM and another is still evolving and has not yet been defined formally. To supplement this role, the Commonwealth tried the concept of the Troika, by constituting a Committee, comprising the past, current and future Chairpersons in Office, but it was not very successful.

2.7. Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)

CMAG is a vital source of support and encouragement to member countries in upholding the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth as enshrined in the Harare Declaration. At the same time, CMAG acts as a ‘court’ for those countries which have persistently violated Harare Commonwealth principles or undermined democracy on the grounds that these reflect national circumstances.

CMAG has provided broad strategic direction to the Commonwealth Secretary-General for the provision of technical assistance required by member governments to help with constitutional reforms, independence of the judiciary and capacity building for effective election management bodies.

CMAG’s work is guided by two mutually reinforcing mandates. These have been endorsed by all member countries. However, these mandates do not constitute any legal instrument and do not have the force of international law. These are:

(i) Millbrook Action Plan on the Harare Declaration (1995) which set up CMAG.

(ii) Realising Millbrook (March 2002) which clarified CMAG’s mandate to cover situations of serious or persistent violations of the Harare Principles other than military overthrow of democratically elected governments.

The clarified mandate of CMAG lists ten measures that CMAG can take in its engagement with the concerned member country to persuade it to comply with the Harare Principles, or face expulsion.

(i) Consultation by the Chairman of CMAG or the Secretary- General with the government concerned;

(ii) Appointing an envoy or group of eminent Commonwealth representatives to facilitate constructive dialogue in the country concerned;

(iii) Encouraging bilateral demarches by member countries, especially those within the region, both to express disapproval and to support early adherence to the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values;

(iv) Soliciting the support and intervention of regional organisations in promoting adherence to the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values;

(v) After due consultations, the prompt public expression by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth’s collective disapproval;

(vi) Suspending the member country concerned from the Councils of the Commonwealth;

(vii) While under suspension from the councils of the Commonwealth, a member country should not receive new Commonwealth technical assistance, other than that directed to the restoration of democracy;

(viii) Stipulating an appropriate timeframe for the re-adherence to the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values, after which CMAG could recommend that the member country concerned be fully suspended from the Commonwealth;

(ix) Other steps considered necessary to engage a member government on the need for progress or to express the collective concern of the Commonwealth;

(x) Consideration of appropriate further bilateral and multilateral measures by all member states (e.g. limitation of government- to-government contacts; people-to-people measures; trade restrictions; and, in exceptional cases, suspension from the association), to reinforce the need for change in the event that the government concerned chooses to leave the Commonwealth and/or persists in violating the principles of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration even after two years.

In circumstances of continuing serious breaches of the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values, CMAG may consider recommending to Heads of Government that the member country concerned be expelled from the Commonwealth.

Step (x) has never been applied by CMAG. Nigeria returned to democratic rule before this step was contemplated in 1997. On Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Fiji Islands, CMAG went only as far as step vii, namely suspending these countries from the Councils of the Commonwealth.

3.1. There are three distinct mechanisms which enable the Commonwealth to remain engaged with member countries in support of deepening democracy, good governance, the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, transparent and inclusive parliamentary processes, freedom of expression, devolved local government and political reform.

A. Formal Channels; B. CMAG Role; C. Informal Channels.

These comprise Secretary-General’s good offices role, Special Envoys,Election Observer Missions, Commonwealth Secretariat, CHOGM and other Commonwealth Ministerial Meetings, Consultations with Chairperson-in Office, Regular Sessions and extra-ordinary Meetings; Submissions to CMAG, Eve of CHOGM Meeting and Report to CHOGM, CMAG Ministerial Missions; Commonwealth Foundation, Commonwealth accredited organisations, Commonwealth civil society and media organisations, Other relevant specialised bodies, academic institutions and Think tanks.

3.2 While there is full and satisfactory coordination between A & B and growing coordination between A & C, there is hardly any coordination between B & C. Closer interaction between civil society and CMAG can build confidence of the countries under CMAG’s audit and multiply channels of assistance. It will also help build domestic capacity for monitoring compliance and release resources for work in other priority areas to link democracy with development.

3.3. The volume and division of work between A & C is balanced but the same is not the case between A & B. While there were as many as 12 countries on the good offices activity in the period following the Malta CHOGM, there were only two countries on the CMAG’s agenda in the same period. CMAG also decided in 2006 to meet in fewer regular sessions than before.

3. Assessment and Conclusions

3.1. CMAG remains the most effective multilateral body in international affairs which has the ability to suspend member countries from the association for violating democratic principles. Its ability to positively engage with countries in order to support and strengthen democratic institutions should be strengthened by enabling the Group to directly call upon other relevant Commonwealth organisations and bodies such as the Commonwealth Foundation, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit to provide assistance through their monitoring, awareness and capacity building workshops and other training programmes.

3.2. Throughout its work, CMAG has focused on two main issues: subordination of the military under civilian democratic institutions and strengthening the machinery and processes for transparent and free elections. CMAG has not laid sufficient emphasis on promoting liberal democracy in member countries. It has not given priority to respect for fundamental freedoms and individual liberty over all other aspects of government responsibility such as equality, social justice, democracy, stability and law and order.

3.3. CMAG has often overlooked the responsibility of governments to promote sustainable development and achieve consensus building as enshrined in the Harare Declaration and reiterated in the Millbrook Action Programme. The Group has limited its work to promoting only the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth in member countries. At the Abuja CHOGM Heads of Government declared that development and democracy are interlinked and enforce each other strongly. The Millbrook Action Programme also requires that CMAG should link sustainable development to the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values and divide its work equally in both areas.

3.4. CMAG’s mandate on the measures it can take against countries failing the Harare Principles is sufficiently detailed in the Millbrook Action Programme as well as the document ‘Realising Millbrook’. However there is no clear definition of what constitutes serious or persistent violations of the Harare Principles. Member governments have escaped CMAG’s scrutiny despite situations where elections have been postponed beyond the constitutional life of the government, where political parties have not been allowed to function freely or where fundamental human rights of citizens have been abrogated. There is an urgent need to agree on some normative criteria of the breaches of Harare Principles the existence of which should justify CMAG’s direct engagement with the concerned countries, in addition to the involvement of the Chairperson in Office and the Commonwealth Secretary-General’s good offices role.

3.5. CMAG should be encouraged to take note of the June 2006 CHRI Report on the performance of Commonwealth members on the UN Human Rights Council titled: Easier Said than Done’. There are 12 Commonwealth countries currently on the UNHRC, namely, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Ghana, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom and Zambia. These countries have a greater moral obligation to fulfill their human rights commitments compared to other member countries which are not represented on the Council.

3.6. In reality, the pursuit of human rights goals by the Commonwealth has been challenging. Other than CMAG and the Commonwealth Secretary General, who represents the collective voice of governments, member countries have been reluctant to speak publicly in condemnation of the serious or persistent violations of the Harare Principles by another member country. Some do so to protect their bilateral relations; others take a broader view of developments where sometimes Harare Principles are overshadowed by other more significant geo-political considerations. There are also those who prefer to keep quiet because they expect that in the event of a similar situation arising in their countries, the others will take a similar stand and not criticise them publicly.

3.7 Another challenge is that in an increasingly globalized world where regional economic blocs are emerging more powerful than global international groupings, the Commonwealth, as an inter-governmental organisation, does not have a massive development assistance budget, political or strategic dimension or military and technological portfolio to keep its members fully committed to the association’s goals.

3.8. Taken seriously, the Commonwealth not only gives weight to the voice of small and developing states in regional economic groupings, it also works in ways that are more action oriented than being just a grouping of diverse countries.

About the author. Mr Syed Sharfuddin is a former Special Adviser for Political Affairs in the Commonwealth Secretariat, London. He was Deputy Conference Secretary of CHOGM and CMAG from 2000 to 2006. Mr Sharfuddin joined the Pakistan Foreign Service in 1977 and served in senior diplomatic positions in Washington, Harare and Dhaka before joining the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1996. Mr Sharfuddin specializes in South Asia and has written regularly on democracy and good governance.

London Buses

International Migration: Challenges and Opportunities

SharafThe growing Diaspora of expatriate populations across the world and their multiple but mutually reinforcing identities and allegiances are a feature of globalisation. This is reinforced by the fact that governments in developing countries are reaching out to their respective overseas communities, especially in the rich countries, for investments and transfer of knowledge for human resource development programmes.

It is also helped by increasing multiculturalism at national and global levels. If the opportunities offered by migration are exploited positively, it can play a vital role in reducing poverty and economic vulnerability and in improving sustainable human development.

There is a need to improve the understanding and implementation of existing legal instruments on migration, supplemented by voluntary and cooperative efforts to provide capacity building, foster dialogue between host states and the countries of origin, and make migration mutually beneficial to countries and migrants.

Better indicators on measuring the impact of migration and development can provide answers to such questions as how this can contribute to reducing poverty. Managing migration means having the correct data for mitigating skills shortages in countries of origin as well as destination.

The orderly and selective management of labour markets can address the gaps between supply and demand and ultimately, dry up the existing ground for traffickers and smugglers who abuse the openings in the system for personal gain.

The relationship between migration and development is not new, certainly not for the developing countries. The history of the South Asian subcontinent as well as other parts of the world is intertwined with the movement of people; people who left their homes for education, trade, business opportunities and even to explore the world and to discover new territories. Over the years, these movements resulted in building a rich political, social and cultural heritage with a common purpose – to pursue happiness, peace and a safe future for the coming generations.

What is new in the context of migration today is the rapid pace, excess capacity and pressing impetus for global mobility. People move for a range of reasons – from the very oppressing, namely conflict, war, persecution, famine and disease to the most positive, imparting technical know-how and skills to others in response to specific requests or for the betterment of their future. Migration is both the result of a cause (positive or negative), as well as an act of voluntary choice due to social and economic circumstances.

Migration also has implications for host populations who can either benefit by allowing migrants to take up job opportunities in the services sector which is not fully exploited. Alternately, the local populations may feel threatened by seeing so many of local opportunities taken away by outsiders who are either better skilled or are willing to accept lower wages.

What is also new today is the greater possibility for gathering of information which allows systematic evaluation of the impact of migration on labour markets, remittance flows and migration networks. This can help countries to formulate effective policies to manage migration flows in a way that they make a greater contribution to global development.

A specific example of the value of migration is its ability to deal with shortages in skills in countries which are developed and abundant in natural resources. Although migrants fill this gap quickly in the host countries, they cause a shortage of skills in the countries of origin which have often invested heavily in producing technical expertise for national development, especially in the sectors of health, education and information technology. The remittances sent home by their nationals cannot replace the brain-drain caused by flight of these skilled workers to greener pastures.

Effective development is promoted not just by aid and trade in goods and services but also by expanding the exchange of experience and skills across countries and regions. Migration reflects the interdependence of the countries of the world as one of the most effective ways of promoting respect and understanding amongst communities and the elimination of causes of friction.

Selective removal of visa barriers to enable young professionals, scientists, business persons, journalists and artists to travel freely between nations is an important element of this strategy.

South Asian countries need to further expand on the existing visa waiver initiatives being negotiated under the aegis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

Some of the benefits of international migration are exposure to globalisation through study visas and short term work permits for skills’ enhancement; internationalisation of production involving movement of labour and management; promotion of fundamental political economic and social values which are common to humanity; increase in foreign direct investments and capital flows necessary for development; and foreign exchange earnings for developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the form of workers’ remittances sent from abroad.

The eradication of human trafficking requires a comprehensive approach which focuses on the prevention and protection of victims and the prosecution of culprits. In 2005 the Commonwealth countries agreed to honour their obligations arising under international law and to support the full implementation of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. They also affirmed the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing with regard to assistance afforded to refugees and to their host communities.

An area often talked about but least implemented is the human rights of migrants. Countries have an obligation under the UN instruments and other subsequent international protocols to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and members of their families. Sometimes appropriate laws exist in the statute books of receiving countries but these are rarely enforced.

There have been many case studies of exploitation of South Asian, South East Asian and Middle Eastern immigrant workers in the oil rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, even though their legal systems provide protection to immigrant workers against abuse of human rights.Many developing countries are reluctant to engage in a national debate on human rights in the context of international security as it puts an additional strain on their law enforcement agencies. The issue of missing persons in Pakistan is an example of the challenge human rights poses in dealing with criminals and terrorists.

The developed world, particularly the G-8 countries, have a moral obligation to translate into action the tall pledges made at various international conferences for improving the standard of life of people through free and fair trade and debt forgiveness initiatives so that people do not leave their countries of origin in search of better livelihoods elsewhere, thereby overloading the migration system in the first place.

Development assistance also needs to focus more on capacity building programmes for improving education and health sectors and strengthening other institutions of the state in order to transform societies through economic, social and human development. Development of innovative approaches for deepening inter-state cooperation can help promote the managed transfer of migrants from countries with adequate labour surplus such as those in South Asia to those facing projected labour shortages such as Europe and North America.

The debate also needs to focus on how the countries of origin that benefit from human resource development and workers’ remittances can prepare themselves to meet the shortages that are temporarily created due to the flight of human capital and absorb their skilled workers back in the countries of origin after they have returned home at the expiry of their work visas.

An important area which should form part of the policy framework on immigration and development is strategy for information management. Migration can be managed properly if there is accurate information about labour markets. Both labour and immigration authorities need to be equipped with the machinery and technical skills to be able to provide accurate figures, when required for planning and evaluation.

There is also need for each country to maintain a database of its nationals with due legal protection for its citizens for sharing of data for security reasons, and upgrade the electronic filing systems of the customs and immigration departments to be able to use this data efficiently.

These systems should be strong enough to cope with the increase of passenger traffic at all entry and exit points such as airports and seaports for business and holiday travel. Malaysia offers an example of a highly integrated information system on citizens in the form of the Malaysian national identity card.

Pakistan has also moved closer to keeping a national database of its citizens for passport purposes but is debatable whether consolidating other data such as information on tax, health records, credit details, etc., is safe and practical. It also needs to be supported by comprehensive data protection legislation and its implementation at all levels to preserve the privacy of citizens.

It is also in the interest of the US and the European Union to double their current assistance to developing countries such as Pakistan to build capacity for designing a complete and efficient immigration database of their nationals as well as maintaining the record of other incoming and outgoing persons to and from their territories for tourism, study, temporary work or other short-term stays.

This article was published by the author in the daily Dawn on 17 April 2007 www.dawn.com